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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
he set aside only if not supported by substantial evidence." The courts are
in the same position as they were under the Wagner Act in reviewing to
determine whether or not there is substantial evidence to sustain the find-
ings on the record as a whole.27 The provisions in the Wagner Act that
findings supported by evidence are conclusive is qualified in both 'the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act by the word "substan-
tial". 28 But the Supreme Court has interpieted the word "evidence" in the
Wagner Act as meaning substantial evidence.2 ' The courts have said that
all that has been done by the statutes is to make definite what was already
implied by the courts.'0
The principal case, though not alone in holding that the scope of judi-
cial review has been broadened,81 appears to be the strongest on the side it
takes. Certainly there are changes in procedure by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, but whether or not there ias been a
substantial broadening of judicial review is not obvious. The majority of
cases recognize that it was the intent of Congress to broaden the scope
of judicial review but that they were not successful. The court in the instant
case has rendered the decision with deference to interpretations by the mem-
bers of Congress in the Congressional reports of both the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act. While, strictly speaking, the scope
of review may not have been extended, the practical effect is a lessening of
power in the National Labor Relations Board by the abolition of hearsay
and expert inferences unsupported by evidence.
BAILMENT - USE OF COIN OPERATED LOCKERS
Defendant rented coin operated lockers to the public retaining dupli-
cate keys which were used to remove goods left overtime. Plaintiff placed
jewelry in one of the lockers, locked it, took the key; and, opening the locker
within the time allowed for storage, he found the jewelry missing. An action
based on constructive bailment was brought by the plaintiff to recover the
value of the goods stored. Held, that since the defendant could not exclude
the plaintiff's access to and control over the plaintiff's property, the ex-
clusive possession and physical control essential to a constructive bailment
were absent and no recovery was allowed. Marsh v. American Locker Co.,
72 A.2d 343 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1950).
In both actual and constructive bailment the common law relationship
26. See NLRB v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 25.
27. See NLRB v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 21.
28. See note 6 supra.
29. See NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299 (1939).
30. See NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., supra note 24.
31. See note 20 supra
CASES NOTED
of bailor and bailee arises ofily when the bailee acquires possession,1 coupled
with full knowledge that the goods in question have come within his cus-
tody.' In order to have possession there must be both physical control over
the thing possessed and a manifested intent to exercise that control.' Intent
may be manifested directly in actual bailment where there is a physical
delivery by the bailor of the subject matter of the bailment and an oral or
written acceptance at that time by the bailee.4 In constructive bailment
the bailee's intent to control is implied when the bailee knowingly assumes
control of the property so as to exclude the possession of the owner and alt
other persons.' Further, if there is no delivery and relinquishment of ex-
clusive possession and the owner's access is not limited by the alleged bailee,6
no rights or liabilities incident to constructive bailment will exist.7
Decisions on the question of constructive bailment indicate that such
a bailment arises only in stances where exclusive physical control and pos-
session on the part of the bailee can be proved.8 The doctrine of construc-
tive bailment has been applied by the courts in safety deposit box9 and
parking lot o cases where it was shown that the bailor had no acess to or
control over his property without the bailee's consent. However, courts have
steadfastly refused to find a bailment when both the alleged bailee and the
alleged bailbr exercised mutual access to and control over property in parked
I. Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n, 95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac. 714 (1928); Spen-
cer v. First Carolinas It. Stock Land Bank, 167 S.C. 36, 165 S.E. 731 (193 2); 4 WILLIS-
TON, CONrAucTs 2890 (rev. ed. 1936).
2. Homan v. Burkhart, 108 Cal. App. 363, 291 Pac. 624 (1940); Waters v. Beau
Site Co:, 114 Misc. 65, 186 N.Y. Supp. 731 (City Ct. 1920); 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
2890 (rev. ed. 1936).
3. BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 231. (1936).
4. Willis v. West, 212 N.C. 656, 194 S.E. 313 (1937).
5. Bertig v. Norman, 101 Ark. 75, 141 S.W. 201 (1912); Wood Livestock Co. v.
Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 50 Idaho 524, 298 Pac. 371 (1931); Hope v. Costello, 222
Mo. App. 187, 297 S.W. 100 (Kans. City Ct. App. 1929); Suits v. Electric Park Amuse-
ment Co., 213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S.W. 656 (Kans. City Ct. App. 1923); Wills v. West,
supra note 4; Posner v. New York Central Ry. Co., 154 Misc. 591, 277 N.Y. Supp. 671
(Munic. Ct. 1935); Key v. Bethurum, 146 Okla. 237, 293 Pac. 1084 (1920); Broaddus"
v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Muskogee, 133 Okla. 1042, 237 Pac. 583 (1925); Tilling-
hast v. Johnson, 34 R.I. 136, 82 At. 788 (1912).
6. Zucker v. Kenworthy Brothers, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 385, 33 A.2d 349 (Sup. Ct.
1943); Zweeres v. Thibault, 112 Vt. 264, 23 A.2d 529 (1942).
,. BROWN, PERSONAL PRoPErT 230 (1936); 4 WILLISTON, CorTRACTs 2890
(rev.ed. 1936).
8. Cussen v. So. Calif. Say. Bank, 133 Cal. 534, 65 Pac. 1099 (1898); Malone v.
Santora, 135 Conn. 286. 64 A.2d 51 (1949); Shaefer v. Washington Safety Deposit Co.,
281 Ill. 43, 117 N.E. 781 (1917); Lockwood v. Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Co.,
28 App. Div. 68, 50 N.Y. Supp. 974 (1st Div. 1898); 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 2923
(rev.ed. 1936).
9. Cussen v. So. Calif. Say. Bank, suora note 8; Shaefer v. Washington Safety De-
posjt Co., supra note 8 (although the safe deposit key was in the possession of the de-
positor, the box was left in a place which was wholly within the possession and control
of the other party and not accessible to the depositor without the former's consent)-
Lockwood v. Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Co., supra note 8 (access to safe deposit
vaults could only be had by the use of two keys, one of which was held by the company,
and the other by the person renting the box).
10. Malone v. Santora, supra note 8 (car keys left in cars under the direction of the
parking lot attendants).
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vehicles,11 storage rooms,12 lodging rooms,'9 offices, 1' and public bowling
alley lockers. 5
The holding in the instant case is consistent with decisions rendered in
all the cases where it has been found that the alleged bailee only had mutual
but non-exclusive access to, or power of physical control over, premises and
personal property of the alleged bailor. The principal case, one of only three
appellate cases concerning coin operated lockers,O is in accord with an
earlier decision, rendered by another court, against the defendant company
withholding relief for loss of goods on bailment principles.'?
BANKRUPTCY - ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR REPRESENTING
CONFLICTING INTERESTS
An attorney was awarded fees for services rendered in connection with
a corporate reorganization proceeding begun under § 77 B1 of the Bankruptcy
Act. His capacity was that of counsel for two sets of bondholders, one of
which held "deficit series" bonds, while the other possessed bonds of the
"surplus series". Since the latter was to be paid first, any successful argu-
ment by the attorney on behalf of the former would reduce the amount
available to the "surplus series" bondholders. Judge Learned Hand held,
that although fees are usually denied to attorneys who represent conflicting
interests in corporate reorganization proceedings, an allowance should be
granted but should be reduced by, at least, one-third. Silbiger v. Prudence
Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1950).
Section 2412 of the Bankruptcy Act gives to the Bankruptcy Court'
the power to award reasonable compensation for services rendered by at-
11. Ex Parle Mobile Light & Ry. Co., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924); Suits
v. Electric Park Amusement Co., supra note 5; Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n, SuPra
note 1 (in the preceding eases no car keys were left with parking lot personnel); The
Parking Lot Cases, 27 CEo. L.J. 162.
12. Slaughter v. Levy, 214 Mo. App. 95, 257 S.W. 1063 (1924) (both landlord
-inc tenant had keys to rented storage rooms).
13. Wills v. Vest, supra note 4 (tenant used lodging rooms for storage of personal
property; landlord retained key thereto for purposes of maid service).
14. Broaddus v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Muskogee, supra note 5 (landlord had
pass key and rendered janitor service).
15. Cornelious v. Berinstein, 183 N.Y. Misc. 685, 50 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(locker accessible to alley operator and person who rented locker).
16. Marsh v. American Locker Co., 72 A.2d 343 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1950); Dyer v.
American Locker Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1st Dep't. 1947)(per curiam); Keleman v.
American Locker Co., 182 N.Y. Misc. 1058, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 411 (City Ct. 1944) (latter
case decided on question of neligence, not bailment).
17. Dyer v. American Locker Co., supra note 16.
1. 30 STAr. 544 (1898), as amended 11 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (1946).
2. 52 STAr. 900 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 641 (1946).
3. Leiman v. Guttman, 336 U.S. 1 (1949); Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178 (1944).
